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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, Professor Frank E.A. Sander of Harvard Law School
envisioned a "multi-door courthouse" that would allow parties to choose
among a variety of dispute resolution forums. 1 Arguing that the prevailing
"one-size-fits-all" litigation-centric approach to dispute resolution is often
mismatched with the actual needs of many disputants, Sander proposed
instead that lawyers and court officials first help parties analyze their
disputes, then suggest appropriate forums to assist in facilitating resolution. 2
For many alternative dispute resolution (ADR) scholars, this speech marks
the advent of the modern movement of alternative dispute resolution. 3
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Harvard Negotiation Research Project, Harvard Law School. A.B., Dartmouth College;
J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank the editors of the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution for their invitation to participate in their 2005 Annual Symposium.
Special thanks also to Florrie Darwin of Harvard Law School for her feedback and
editorial assistance. Thanks also to my able research assistant Jennifer Reynolds for her
excellent work.
I Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (Apr. 7-9,
1976); Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
2 Sander, supra note 1, at 112-13.
3 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: A Brief History of the
Foundations of Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13-31
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). See also Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is
Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289,
289 n.3 (2003) (noting that "Frank Sander's speech ... introducing the concept of the
'multi-door courthouse' has been identified by many as a key event in the birth of
modem ADR"); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of
Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DtSP. RESOL. 295, 298 n.11
(2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2000); Barbara McAdoo &
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As a consequence of the increasing use of various and highly
differentiated ADR processes, ADR scholars, ethicists, and practitioners have
begun examining the appropriateness of lawyers' ethical rules as embodied
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). 4 Of particular interest
for many of these writers has been how to square the Model Rules' mandate
for zealous advocacy with the imperative for cooperation, collaboration, and
joint problem-solving that is often required of processes such as mediation or
facilitated consensus-building. 5 The fruit of this work has been the creation
and adoption of new or supplementary ethical standards for mediators such
as the AAA-ABA-ACR Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,6 the
American Academy of Family Mediators Ethics Codes, 7 and the Uniform
Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376, 376 n.3 (1997).
4 See, e.g., Joshua Isaacs, A New Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical
Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005); Scott
R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the
Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REv. 475
(2005); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats
on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 505, 508-09 (2003); Kimberlee K.
Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective
Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935 (2001); Donald R. Lundberg, The Amended Indiana Rules of
Professional Conduct: Conflicts of Interest, RES GESTAE, Dec. 2004, at 16; James M.
Bowie, Ethical Issues in Construction Mediation: Are There Any Rules?, CONSTRUCTION
LAWYER, Spring 2004, at 33; Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Means:
Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407 (1997); Douglas H.
Yam, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and State
Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 427 ("[T]he zealous advocate will
likely prove a failure in mediation, where creativity, focus on the opposing sides'
interests, and a broadening, not narrowing of issues, may be more valued skills.").
6 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfmal05.pdf
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005). The revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators were
adopted by the American Bar Association's House of Delegates at their August 2005
meeting in Atlanta. It is the product of three years of work to revise the Model Standards
passed in 1994. The revised Standards have been approved by the Dispute Resolution
Section and the Litigation Section after hundreds of hours of work and various public
forums in New York, California, Florida, and Texas.
7 See Note, Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, 39
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 121, 127-34 (2001).
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Mediation Act (UMA). 8 Likewise, in arbitration, arbitrators subscribe to
ethics rules promulgated by third-party credentialing organizations such as
the American Arbitration Association or the National Arbitration Forum. 9
Though separate ethics rules exist for lawyers who mediate or arbitrate,
there continues to be no separate ethical rules for lawyers engaged in the
process of negotiation.' 0 Instead, lawyers who negotiate simply subscribe to
the MRPC, a set of rules designed with the litigation process in mind.
In this article, I argue that ethical rules should be determined by the
particular process in which the lawyers are engaged and that these rules
should be mandatory, not elective, for the particular process. In making this
case, I will focus my analysis primarily on the role of the lawyer in the
negotiation process. I distinguish my proposal from both those which
advocate specific ethics rules based on context or type of practice1' and those
which permit or encourage a more free-market, contracts-based approach to
legal ethics, 12 including models of collaborative law, a specific type of
contracts-based approach to negotiation.
8 UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (amended 2003), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
9 See THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005); NATIONAL
ARBITRATION FORUM, NAF CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARBITRATORS, available at
http://www.arb-forum.com/arbitrators/code-arbitrators.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
10 But see ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 1 (2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settlementnegotiations.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005). The ABA Section on Litigation created these guidelines to assist
attorneys involved in settlement negotiations. Unlike the MRPC, these guidelines are
entirely advisory and are not binding on practicing lawyers. For practice notes on this
matter, see Steve Morris, Christina C. Stipp & Elizabeth Sorokac-Barnett, Rules of
Professional Conduct, Ethical Conflicts Facing Litigators, and Guidelines for Settlement
Negotiations, SJ035 ALI-ABA 1575 (2004).
11 Fred C. Zacharias has written extensively on this topic. For an overview, see
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991); Reform or Professional Responsibility As Usual Whither the
Institutions of Regulation and Discipline?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505 (2003); Five
Lessons for Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 (2002).
12 See Peppet, supra note 4; see also Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and
Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee
Mediation, 82 TEx. L. REV. 227, 275-85 (2003); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 306
(1995) ("A lawyer is first and foremost an agent. A principal can generally structure a
relationship with an agent along any lines the principal chooses, with the agent's
consent."); Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Contract
Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of the Professional Responsibility Considerations in the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1991); Paula A. Monopoli,
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To make my argument, I first provide an overview of the emergence of
"process pluralism" in the legal system over the past thirty years. I then
articulate a theory of professional ethical codes, namely, that they exist
primarily to enable the professional to better achieve her purposes in a
particular activity, not to impede or limit or constrain her ability to behave.
The idea of ethics codes as an enabling rather than a constraining force in
professional life is largely lost in today's lowest common denominator
approach to legal ethics. Indeed, the various sets of ethical rules that exist for
litigation, mediation, and arbitration are fundamentally designed to improve
the way in which these various functions operate.
My focus then turns specifically to the ethics of negotiation. Unlike the
other dispute resolution processes in which lawyers engage, each having its
own particular ethical rules, negotiation continues to piggyback on the ethical
guidelines used for litigation, namely, the MRPC. 13 Applying the model I lay
out for designing ethics codes earlier in the piece, I make the case that
negotiation-like mediation, arbitration, and litigation-should have its own
set of ethical guidelines, designed to further the particular set of purposes and
goals that negotiation is best suited to achieve. In so doing, I reject arguments
that would allow for the exercise of individual autonomy by lawyers or
clients with respect to different approaches to and different ethical guidelines
for negotiation. 14 Instead, I contend that ethical guidelines for negotiation
should be mandatory, just as they are for litigation, mediation, and
arbitration. The article maintains that ethical rules for negotiators must help
create the conditions between the parties that are most likely to facilitate a
good outcome in negotiation (as opposed to a good outcome in mediation,
litigation, or some other dispute resolution process). The article also
recommends some of the basic principles that should guide the drafters of the
new model rules for negotiation.
The article concludes by anticipating some of the philosophical or
intellectual objections to my suggestions for a new approach to legal ethics. I
address these concerns and attempt to offer responses to them. In addition, I
also acknowledge some of the more practical barriers that would likely
impede implementation of my reforms and offer some suggestions for
managing them.
Drafting Attorneys as Fiduciaries: Fashioning an Optimal Ethical Rule for Conflicts of
Interest, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 446 (2005) ("Fashioning an optimal ethical norm in the
context of drafting[,] attorneys as fiduciaries must be informed by efficiency, fairness,
and the complex nature of the attorney-client relationship.").
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4.1 (a)-(b), R. 1.6, and R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2003).
14 See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 4, at 510-11 (defending the "moral pluralism" of the
legal profession and arguing that lawyers and their clients should have the autonomy to
choose more traditional hard-bargaining and bluffing tactics in negotiation).
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While this piece is not the first to propose a modification of ethical rules
for negotiators, 15 it is the first to suggest that the change should be both
sweeping (i.e., not just a re-wording of Model Rule 4.1) and mandatory. It is
also the first to argue that the perspective from which we should fashion our
ethical rules should be the functional purpose of the process by which
lawyers seek to achieve their goal. I contend that tailoring ethics to a specific
legal specialization or around subjective claims of moral or cosmic "right" or
"wrong" will lead to confusion and frustration. I also reject more recent
arguments that would encourage or permit lawyers to contract privately for
their own ethical rules. 16
II. LAWYERING IN AN AGE OF PROCESS PLURALISM
In their 1994 piece, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss, Frank E.A. Sander
and Stephen Goldberg posited that because each dispute resolution process
has features that foster a somewhat different set of objectives, thoughtful
lawyers and dispute resolvers should first diagnose the features of a dispute
before prescribing the appropriate dispute resolution process.17 Far too many
attorneys plunge headlong into litigation whenever a client comes to them
with a problem. Some lawyers do this because they are either unaware of
other process choices or lack the training and skills to avail themselves of
them. 18 A smaller number do it because the legal profession has morphed
largely into a business and the pressure to generate large fees forces lawyers
to recommend the most costly procedure for their clients, regardless of what
might be appropriate. 19 Whatever the reasons, a lawyer's tendency to
automatically pursue litigation as the solution to a client's problems is akin to
a cardiologist's performing bypass surgery on every patient who walks
through the door. No matter how successful heart surgeons may be in the
operating room, they are more dangerous than helpful if they perform a
15 See generally Yam, supra note 4, at 207; Brian C. Haussmann, The ABA Ethical
Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1218 (2004).
16 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 674
(2001) (explicating and defending a contractarian approach to legal ethics).
17 Sander, supra note 1, at 127 (predicating different approaches to dispute
resolution upon the relationship of the parties involved).
18 See generally Robert C. Bordone, Michael L. Moffitt & Frank E.A. Sander, The
Next Thirty Years: Directions and Challenges in Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 507-22.
19 Cf Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multidoor
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297, 382 (1996).
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triple-bypass on every patient regardless of the patient's symptoms or
condition. For physicians, the ability to diagnosis an ailment before
prescribing an appropriate remedy is critically important. Amazingly,
however, most lawyers fail to diagnose the ailments of their clients before
recommending litigation. By reflexively recommending litigation to every
client, lawyers are essentially recommending the legal equivalent of open-
heart surgery to every patient.
Since 1976, the number and variety of dispute resolution processes used
by lawyers has expanded dramatically.20 Litigation represents just one point
on a broad continuum of dispute resolution processes ranging from
negotiation to mediation, arbitration, and a menu of hybrid processes such as
med-arb, early neutral evaluation, and the mini-trial. 21
At the most general level, the primary objective of each dispute
resolution process is to resolve disputes between individuals, organizations,
or groups. However, a look below this obvious generic purpose reveals that
each of these processes offers parties an approach to dispute resolution that is
informed by different values and accomplishes different purposes.22
In addition, how one defines a good outcome varies enormously
depending on the process used to resolve the dispute. 23 Highly skilled
mediators would be unlikely to claim that a dispute they mediated had a good
outcome simply because the dispute was resolved quickly or went away.
Instead, their assessment of a good outcome in mediation would take into
consideration whether the mediators had upheld principles such as neutrality,
20 See, e.g., Center for Public Resources, The ABC's of ADR: A Dispute Resolution
Glossary, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147 (1995) (listing and defining more
than twenty public, private, and court-annexed ADR processes); see also STEPHEN
GOLDBERG, FRANK SANDER, NANCY ROGERS & SARAH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-6 (4th ed. 2003); Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is
Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003).
21 See GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS & COLE, supra note 20. See generally chapters
in Understanding Dispute Resolution Processes, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 277-406.
22 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New
Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 97 (2002) (referencing Lon Fuller's claim that each kind
of dispute resolution process-mediation, arbitration, consensus-building, etc.-has its
own "morality" and individual functional analysis).
23 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and
Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 7, 10 (2004); see also Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System
Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2004, at
221 (arguing that courts should oversee development of dispute resolution design process
in commercial arbitration to ensure fair outcomes for both parties).
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informed consent, self-determination of the parties, voluntariness, and
confidentiality, 24 since mediation is a process that values outcome
determination by the parties and party autonomy. 25 Arbitrators, on the other
hand, would measure success by criteria such as whether the parties
ultimately comply with the arbitrators' decision, whether the decision saved
the parties time and money, and whether the parties perceived the decision
and the process as fair.26 A good outcome in litigation might be defined by
measuring whether justice was achieved, a right was vindicated, or
appropriate reparations were made. Adjudication also provides third-party
and assumedly more neutral decisionmaking that has the immediate
legitimacy and credibility of enforcement by the state. From the perspective
of parties embroiled in litigation, whether the resolution of a matter is
"successful" can often be boiled down to a binary question of whether a
particular litigant won or lost.27
With the emergence of process pluralism in dispute resolution during the
past thirty years, nearly every law school has recognized the importance of
offering courses on mediation, negotiation, arbitration and other alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) processes. 28 But more and more law schools are
24 See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA P. LOVE, ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 325 (2005)
(arguing that "mediation is successful if it accomplishes any of the following goals:
giving disputing parties an enhanced understanding of their dispute and of each other's
perspective, enabling parties to develop options responsive to issues raised by the dispute,
and bringing closure to the dispute on terms that are mutually agreeable"). For an
example of a more formal mediation assessment tool, see Nancy L. Hollett, Margaret S.
Herrman, Dawn Goettler Eaker & Jerry Gale, The Assessment of Mediation Outcome:
The Development and Validation of an Evaluative Technique, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 345
(2002).
25 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 6; see also
Michael H. Diamant, Elizabeth M. Zoller & Philip R. Bautista, Strategies for Mediation,
Arbitration and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution, SK074 ALI-ABA 205 (2005);
GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS & COLE, supra note 20.
26 See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of
ADR, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 449 (2005); see also Douglas Yam, Foreword.: An Introduction
to Ethics in a World of Mandatory Arbitration, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 903 (2002);
Diamant, Zoller & Bautista, supra note 24.
27 See generally Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a Dispute Resolution Alternative, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 336-57.
28 See 2003 ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW SCHOOL DISPUTE RESOLUTION COURSES AND
PROGRAMS, available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/aba/about.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2005); see also Robert B. Moberly, ADR in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities
and Challenges, available at http://www.conflict-resolution.net/articles/moberly.cfm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2005); Kay Elkins-Elliot & Frank Elliot, Settlement Advocacy, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 7 (2004).
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also realizing that teaching law students how to mediate or arbitrate or
litigate is not enough. Schools also need to teach their students how to
diagnose the quality and nature of their clients' disputes in order to train
them to prescribe the appropriate dispute resolution process. In short, lawyers
are increasingly aware that they need to be equipped with tools of diagnosis,
not just tools to perform surgery.29 Demonstrating that not all disputes are
alike and that litigation is not the only, the best, or even, at times, an
appropriate, process for the management of many disputes, has been one of
the most important contributions of the modem ADR movement to the legal
profession. 30 Indeed, the idea that a dispute resolution forum or process
should be tailored to meet the particular needs of the parties in the context of
any given dispute has spawned a proliferation of processes and hybrids, from
consensus building 31 to various forms of mediation including facilitative,
evaluative, and transformative.32
III. THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Professions articulate and adopt codes of ethics for many reasons. 33 At
the most basic level, ethical rules govern, direct, and limit the conduct of the
29 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure
and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 681,701 (2005) (stating that law
students must be taught how to decide whether a particular dispute should be resolved
through the filing of a lawsuit or through some other dispute resolution process and
making the case for a much more integrated model of legal education).
30 "Any discussion of recent developments in civil litigation must address the virtual
revolution that has taken place regarding alternative dispute resolution (ADR)."
Developments in the Law, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1752, 1851
(2000). "Attorneys have witnessed a steady growth in their clients' recourse to ADR in
place of lawsuits, and ADR is increasingly incorporated into the litigation process
itself-in the form of court-annexed arbitration, mediation, summary jury trials, early
neutral evaluation, and judicial settlement conferences." Id. "'Alternative' models of
dispute resolution have inarguably penetrated the mainstream; the relevant question now
is how they will change it." Id. See also supra note 3.
31 See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the
Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 30 (2002); Wang Wenying,
The Role of Conciliation in Resolving Disputes: A P.R. C. Perspective, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 421 (2005); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 95.
32 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 24.
33 See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One
of a Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 27-8
(1996) (providing a historical look at the development of ethics in the legal profession).
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members of a profession. 34 Ethics can also be used to control competition,
provide guidance to members of a profession, or help individuals distinguish
right from wrong. 35 In the legal profession, the MRPC have come to be
understood as setting the basic limits of appropriate behavior-a minimum or
floor to which all members of the profession must adhere for membership in
good standing within the profession. 36
Understanding ethics and ethical guidelines as limiting the set of
appropriate or acceptable behaviors of a profession is certainly a workable
way to give meaning to what it means to be an "ethical lawyer." In some
sense, the very nature of ethical rules is to set limits or constraints on what
those bound to the rules may or may not do.37 At the same time, thinking of
ethics simply as demarcating the outer limits of acceptable behavior for a
profession ends up being an essentially pessimistic and unhelpful way to
envision the role that ethical rules can and ought to play in the professional
life of attorneys in the 2 1 st Century.
Instead of defining ethics in ways that simply constrain behavior, we
might imagine that ethical codes ought to be conceived and crafted to serve
as facilitators of particular kinds of behaviors, attitudes, and conditions that
ennoble the professional activities and goals of a profession's members. In
this more constructively framed understanding of ethics, we analyze the
appropriateness of a particular set of ethical norms not by highly subjective
notions of what any one person or group might think of as right or wrong or
morally good or bad. Nor do we develop ethical codes based on aspirational,
high-minded notions of "zealous advocacy" that may sound noble but in fact
provide little practical guidance to the attorney engaged in a host of dispute
resolution processes, only some portion of which could even be considered
true "advocacy" in the traditional sense of the term.
Instead, the approach to designing a code of ethics that I champion here
is grounded in a much more functional analysis. Ethical rules should help
create a professional environment in which practitioners are able to most
34 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with Practice: Plurality in
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards, 39 IDAHO L. REV.
399, 412 (2003).
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Emily Olson, The Ethics of Attorney Advertising: The Effects of
Different State Regulatory Regimes, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1055, 1056 (2005)
(examining how advertising affects the ideal of "the chained relationship of the lawyer to
his clients, to his professional brethren and to the public") (quoting the preface of the
Model Rules).
37 See David J. Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course
Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REv. 424, 444-45 (1990) (considering
how some scholars describe rules as effectively engendering stable expectations).
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competently, efficiently, and successfully produce the best possible result. In
the case of the legal profession, ethical rules should foster optimal conditions
between lawyers to achieve the goals of a particular form of representation,
be it adjudication, mediation, arbitration, or some other activity.
In order to devise meaningful and truly enabling ethical codes using this
functional standard, one must work backwards by initially seeking answers to
several important, but basic questions: First, considering the particular
activity for which one is to design ethical rules, what would constitute a
successful outcome to this process or activity? Answering this question
carefully-with specificity and nuance-matters if one is to succeed in
developing an ethical code that will help the practitioner to achieve those
goals more successfully.
With the answer to this question in mind, one must next consider, what
conditions should exist to increase the likelihood that the parties will achieve
this desired "good" or "successful" outcome as a result of engaging in this
process? Again, the more specific and detailed an answer one can provide to
this question, the more successful the drafters of the ethical code will be in
promulgating a set of rules that are both implementable but also useful to the
practitioner.
Finally, one must query, what kinds of behavioral or ethical norms will
create and thereby facilitate a good outcome to the process? Using the
answer to this question, the ethicist is now prepared to design rules that will
be fitting to the forum or process being used.
Indeed, approaching the design and implementation of ethical codes with
the notion that the ethical code should fit the purpose or function of the
professional role in which the lawyers are to engage is a profoundly
liberating and capacity-building way to develop such rules. Viewing an
ethical code or set of rules as potentially enabling rather than limiting
professional behavior turns traditional notions of ethics and ordinary ways of
analyzing or talking about ethics on their head. Instead of asking questions
that frame ethics as essentially constraining, such as "When is it legal to lie
in negotiations?," 38 this approach embraces ethics as helpful tools that create
an environment supportive of the process in which lawyers are engaged. The
transformation of ethics from "impediment" or "barrier" to "tool" and
"facilitator" is a profound and important one.
Ethical codes should not simply limit or constrain professional behavior,
acting as some kind of floor below which one's behavior is unacceptable;
rather they should guide and facilitate the performance of the established
38 See G. Richard Shell, When Is It Legal to Lie in Negotiations?, 32 SLOAN MGMT.
REv. 93 (1991).
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professional role. 39 Adopting an approach to ethics that puts professional
competence and success ahead of subjective arguments about right, wrong,
truth, or tradition puts into clearer perspective how we might think about the
efficacy of a particular set of ethical rules for a given activity. It also frees us
from the morass of debating divergent views of morality, values, and
personal beliefs. With a functional approach, ethics are not about whose
version of morality is more praiseworthy, but rather about what climate is
most suited to ensuring that a particular job (whatever it may be) is done in
the best possible way. The latter inquiry, as we will see below, lends itself to
a much more objective and empirically verifiable set of guidelines to
codifying ethics. This approach to ethical codes I call "process-enabling."
IV. ADR AND PROCESS-ENABLING ETHICAL CODES
Since the widespread introduction of mediation, arbitration, consensus-
building, and other ADR processes to the legal landscape during the 1970s
and 80s, legal ethicists, ADR scholars, and practitioners have struggled to
understand how the MRPC, an ethical code designed primarily with the
adversarial process of litigation in mind, might work when lawyers engage in
varying roles and in processes that differ enormously from the traditional
litigation.40 With respect to mediation and arbitration, the overwhelming
consensus has been that the MRPC were ill-suited to the task of providing
appropriate guidance to lawyers acting as third-party mediators or advocates
in these processes. 41 Though there has been less consensus on exactly how
39 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of
Conductfor International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 357 (2002).
40 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party
Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 804
(1999) (asserting that the Model Rules provide little guidance to lawyers acting in
alternative roles); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 66; see also supra note 4. See
generally Pamela Phillips, The Wisdom of Having a Representation Agreement-And
What It Should Cover, 824 PLI/PAT 749 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo,
Eyes On the Prize: The Struggle for Professionalism, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2005, at
13; Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of ADR
Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETICs 427 (2000).
41 "Not surprisingly, the Model Rules as drafted provided little guidance to lawyers
participating in ADR. Instead, they reflected the then dominant paradigm: lawyers are
advocates in an adversarial system." Fairman, supra note 4, at 508-09, citing Douglas H.
Yarn, supra note 4, at 210-12 (footnotes omitted). See also Kovach, supra note 4; John
Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice for Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1315, 1330-60 (2003); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on
Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of
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the organized bar should rectify this situation, 42 over time process-specific
ethical codes have been promulgated for mediation 43 and for arbitration.44
Each of these process-specific ethical codes represents attempts to govern
behavioral norms or expectations that are more appropriate to the kind of
process for which they were designed. That is, to at least some extent, the
existence of separate ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators is an
acknowledgement that the professional role of the attorney in these processes
differs from the professional role of the attorney in traditional adjudication. 45
Consequently, the guidelines provide further clarification and direction for
lawyers engaged in these processes.
Interestingly, even though negotiation is by far the most extensively used
ADR process,46 to date there has been no separate ethical code or rule set
developed for lawyers engaged in the process of negotiation.47 Indeed, only
recently have legal academics and ethicists begun to even consider the
question of whether the MRPC are fitting or appropriate ethical rules for
negotiation.48 This is not to say that little has been written about negotiation
ethics. On the contrary, there is a vast literature on the subject.49 But the vast
Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 141 (2004); Isaacs, supra note 4, at 838-842; Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 40, at 804; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 423. "[T]he great variety of
roles and tasks taken on by third-party neutrals demonstrates the failure of the adversary
model to provide standards of acceptable behavior in these areas." Id.
42 See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 4, at 504-14 (highlighting some major trends,
critiques, and proposed solutions within the area of legal ethics).
43 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 6.
4 4 See THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra
note 9.
45 See Kovach, supra note 34, at 430. "The practice of law will continue to evolve
and change... [A]ttorneys need to have guidance in all aspects of legal practice-the
innovative as well as the more traditional." Id.
46 See GOLDBERG, SANDER, ROGERS & COLE, supra note 20, at 17. "Negotiation-
communication for the purpose of persuasion-is the preeminent mode of dispute
resolution." Id.
47 See Peppet, supra note 4 (arguing that the minimalist ethical standard for
negotiation remains because the alternative is to "end the legal profession as we know
it"). The ABA Section on Litigation did promulgate ethical guidelines for settlement in
2002, however. See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, supra note
10.
48 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 425. "Current legal ethics codes assume a
clear distinction (based on our adversary system) between the advocates and the neutral,
impartial and passive decision-maker who operates at arms-length from the parties." Id
49 See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L.
REv. 1219 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or a
Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761
(1990); Scott R. Peppet, ADR Ethics, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72 (2004); CARRIE MENKEL-
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majority of this focuses on various applications of the MRPC to the tension
between disclosure, deception, and duties that lawyers have with respect to
their role as officers of the court. Many of these articles focus narrowly on
Model Rule 4.1, largely ignoring the fact that even though other rules do not
address negotiation very specifically, the entire thrust of the rules breeds a
climate between lawyers that undermines a problem-solving approach to
negotiation.50 Very little examination has been given to the fundamental
question of whether the MRPC ought to even apply to lawyers engaged in
negotiation.
While one may imagine a host of explanations for why there has been so
little examination of whether the MRPC are the appropriate ethical
guidelines for negotiation, I would suggest two of the primary reasons. First,
many in the legal profession--even many scholars, practitioners, and
proponents of ADR-simply do not consider negotiation as a process that is
truly distinct from litigation.5 i As a student of negotiation, and one who sees
the tremendous possibilities of negotiation for resolving disputes, producing
better outcomes for parties, and forging stronger relationships, I find the
failure of many legal scholars, practitioners, and others to acknowledge the
independent legitimacy of negotiation as a process choice deeply troubling
and wrong-headed. Unlike arbitration and mediation, which clearly represent
a track apart from the traditional litigation route, negotiation remains for
MEADOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (2004);
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS-A COMPREHENsIVE GUIDE (Phillis Bernard & Bryant G.
Garth eds., 2002).
50 See James J. Alfmi, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 255, 269 (1999) (arguing that Model
Rule 4.1 is inadequate to support the ethical needs of the "settlement culture"); see also
Fairman, supra note 4, at 525 ("Model Rule 4.1 only prohibits false statements of fact. As
applied to negotiation, the comments have been used to support an exception for
'puffery'-a euphemism for lying.") (internal footnotes omitted).
51 See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493, 506 (1989). "[N]egotiation is neither a profession... nor a discrete activity
with a defined mission.. . [but rather] a process that takes place in a multitude of
contexts." Id. That the legal community had long conceived of negotiation and litigation
as inextricably linked is evident from a 1985 article in which Carrie Menkel-Meadow
raises the possibility that one day lawyers might specialize in negotiation, separate from
litigation. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 492 n.41 (1985), citing
Roger Fisher, What About Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221 (1983). Cf
Charles Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How
to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713 (1997) (asserting that
most people do not think of "negotiation" as a typical ADR process even though it is, in
fact, the most basic form of dispute resolution).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
many nothing more than a component of the litigation process. 52 To the
degree that negotiation is simply considered as one part of litigation, akin to
filing a complaint, submitting interrogatories, or conducting a deposition, it is
unlikely that there will be any serious consideration of whether there ought to
be separate ethical rules for negotiation.
Any serious scholar of negotiation understands, of course, that
negotiation, properly understood, is a process entirely separate from
litigation.53 Its purposes, methods, and goals are distinct from the set of
purposes, methods, and goals that litigators, mediators, or arbitrators might
adopt.54 Unless and until the legal academy accepts the legitimacy and
integrity of the negotiation process as something entirely apart from
litigation, it is unlikely that significant attention will be focused on whether
the MRPC ought to apply to lawyers engaged in negotiation. And without a
serious examination of this question and a corresponding reform effort, it is
unlikely that lawyers will be able to consistently deliver outcomes for their
clients that capitalize on the features of the negotiation process that allow for
maximum value-creation for parties. My own view is that the clock is ticking
on the legal profession to acknowledge this reality. The more reluctant
lawyers are to embrace negotiation fully as a separate academic discipline
and a separate process-choice for dispute resolution, the more the legal
profession is likely to be supplanted by conflict management consultants,
public policy analysts, businesspeople, and those from other related
professions who have the skill-set and training to use negotiation as an
independent problem-solving process to find integrating outcomes for their
clients.
To be clear about my proposition, I do not contend that lawyers do not
bargain or negotiate as a component part of the litigation process. Of course
they do. Litigation typically involves negotiations over various procedural
52 Norton, supra note 51, at 506.
53 See, e.g., MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 24 at
xxxiv (identifying negotiation, mediation, and arbitration as dispute resolution processes
separate from litigation); ALAN S. RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET,
PROCESSES OF DisPuTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (3d ed. 2005); GOLDBERG,
SANDER, ROGERS & COLE, supra note 20; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV.
637, 639 (1976). "[O]bservation suggests that.., negotiation consists largely of the
invocation, elaboration, and distinction of principles, rules, and precedents." Id.
54 See Andrea K. Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to
Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113 (2000) (distinguishing
negotiation from other ADR processes when determining how to resolve a particular
dispute); see also John Lande, Why a Good Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for
Mediation, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 9 (2005).
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and scheduling matters, and in most adjudicatory processes there are times
(or at least a time) when parties exchange offers and demands in an effort to
settle the dispute. This exchange is called "negotiation," and it is unarguably
a component part of the larger litigation process that has been put in motion
months or sometimes years earlier.
What I argue here, however, is that apart from the back-and-forth dance
of demands and counter-offers that occurs during litigation, there also exists
an entirely separate process of negotiation--one that is used both in dispute
resolution and deal-making. This type of negotiation consists of a set of
activities that is quite different from the stereotypical dance of concessions
and haggling that many think of as "negotiation." This separate process is the
kind of negotiation that many have been teaching in law and business schools
as well as in graduate programs in public policy for the past twenty-five
years. Skillful attorneys with enlightened clients can choose this process
before a complaint is filed. When they do, they engage in a series of
communications-in a process-the purpose and goals of which typically
include but are not limited to simply resolving the dispute at hand via a
highly ritualized dance of concessions. Negotiation in this sense, then, is a
process choice in the same way that mediation and arbitration are process
choices.
A second reason that could explain why there have been few proposals
for a separate process-enabling set of ethics for negotiation is simple: the
MRPC are actually well suited to both litigation and negotiation. I have
argued above that ethical rules ought to be designed in ways that facilitate or
enable practitioners of a particular dispute resolution process to more
effectively effectuate a good outcome as defined by the parameters or
purpose of the process. That legal mediators and arbitrators have crafted their
own sets of ethical rules while legal negotiators have not may simply be
explained by the fact that the MRPC are doing an adequate job of supporting
the conditions that allow for successful negotiation outcomes. In order to get
an answer to this question, we need to better understand the goal of
negotiation as an independent dispute resolution process.
V. DEFINING SUCCESS OR A GOOD OUTCOME IN NEGOTIATION
Ever since Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton wrote their
groundbreaking book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving
In,55 the fundamental understanding of what constitutes a good outcome in
55 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATRON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
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negotiation has been changing. 56 Prior to the publication of Getting to Yes,
most lawyers had a relatively simplistic understanding of success in
negotiation. 57 For some, it may have involved simply resolving a dispute
without having to go to trial. 58 For others, success may have meant getting a
better deal than the other side, or claiming more value in the negotiation.59
During the past twenty years, however, negotiation scholars have come to
understand that a problem-solving or interest-based approach to negotiation
lends itself to a much more sophisticated, nuanced, and advantageous
conception of a good outcome. 60
While most negotiation instructors continue to expose their students to
various competing models of negotiation, including competitive, adversarial,
and zero-sum approaches, the vast majority of negotiation teaching and
pedagogy identifies interest-based negotiation, the goal of which is to expand
the size of the overall pie before dividing it, as a "best practice" in
negotiation. 61 While a number of formulas exist to measure success within a
problem-solving, principled, or interest-based approach, it is fair to say that
most of us who write and teach about legal negotiation would define a good
outcome in a negotiation as one in which any agreement we reach: a) Is
better than our best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA); b)
56 See, e.g., Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and
Human Needs, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 669, 693 (2003) (observing that GETTING
TO YES has become a "beacon of enlightenment" for new generations of students and
practitioners that moved negotiation pedagogy from mere description to prescription); see
also Richard C. Reuben, Harvard Conference Goes Back to Basics: Teaching of
Negotiation, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2000, at 32 (stating that GETrING TO YES helped
to frame a generation of understanding about the field).
57 FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 55, at xviii. "People ... see two ways to
negotiate: soft or hard. The soft negotiator wants to avoid personal conflict and so makes
concessions readily in order to reach agreement. . . . The hard negotiator sees any
situation as a contest of wills in which the side that takes the more extreme position and
holds out longer fares better." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. See also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 3 (2000)
(arguing that "[t]he incentives to act combatively, selfishly, or inefficiently can be
compelling").
60 See Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra
note 3, at 279-303.
61 See Robert C. Bordone & Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation Teaching in Law
Schools, in NEGOTIATION PEDAGOGY: A RESEARCH SURVEY OF FOUR DISCIPLINES
(Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School ed., 2000); see also PROGRAM ON
NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CLEARINGHOUSE, NEGOTIATION SYLLABUS
COLLECTION, available at http://www.pon.org/catalog/product-info.php?products-id=333
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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Meets our interests very well, the interests of the other side acceptably, and
the interests of any third parties who may be affected by the agreement at
least tolerably enough to be durable; c) Is the most efficient and value-
creating of many possible sets of deal terms; d) Is based on a norm of
fairness or some objective standard, criterion, or principle that is external to
the parties themselves; e) Identifies commitments that are specific, realistic,
and operational for both sides; f) Is premised on clear and efficient
communication; and g) Improves or at least does not harm the relationship
between the parties where "relationship" is defined as the ability of the
parties to manage their differences well.62
The above definition of a good outcome is one that is accepted to a large
degree by virtually anyone who teaches and studies negotiation. At its core, it
recognizes that, unlike the situation in litigation and arbitration, and even, to
a certain extent, in mediation, the value-added of negotiation from a process
perspective is the potential to use creativity and mutual information exchange
to produce deals that actually enlarge the size of the pie for the parties.
Admittedly, many in the legal profession still might reject the notion that
legal negotiation has a unique capacity to help parties create value when
conducted properly, and that any definition of success for negotiation must
therefore be measured simply by whether the final result did, in fact, claim
the most value available from a fixed pie.63 While these people are free to
defend older, more traditional notions of negotiation as nothing more than a
dance of concessions and a battle of wills, the overwhelming majority of
negotiation scholars and practitioners recommend that lawyers adopt an
integrative or value-creating approach to negotiation. 64 For these reasons, I
argue that the definition of a good outcome for negotiation outlined above
reasonably encapsulates the overwhelming view of most legal and
negotiation scholars. Those who would continue to disagree with this, 65
62 See Patton, supra note 60; See also Roger Fisher, A Code of Negotiation Practices
for Lawyers, 1 NEGOT. J. 105, 107-08 (1985).
63 See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEo. L.J.
369 (1996); Peter Robinson, Contending with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously
Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 963, 966 (1998)
(pointing out that when negotiators assume a zero-sum game, they are compelled to
behave competitively); Charles A. Goldstein & Sarah L. Weber, The Art of Negotiating,
37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 325, 338 (1992). "[A]lthough you should take pains to
understand the objectives of your opponent, whether or not your opponent has achieved,
or failed to achieve, his or her objectives is immaterial if you have achieved yours." Id.
64 See, e.g., Wetlaufer, supra note 63, at 369 n. 1 (citing a long list of negotiation
scholars who recommend an integrative approach to bargaining).
65 I acknowledge that there continue to be a small number of law school negotiation
teachers who continue to teach students that deception and value claiming are most
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while free to hold their opinions, are part of an ever-shrinking minority of
those who continue to teach "tricks and tips" as the preferred approach to
legal negotiations.
VI. CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE A GOOD OUTCOME IN THE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Stipulating for now that my definition of a good outcome is a fair and
reasonable one that is widely taught, I review the circumstances or conditions
necessary to help parties in negotiation arrive at such a good outcome.
Thanks to the empirical work of colleagues in game theory, social and
cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and other related disciplines, a
bounty of scholarship produced during the last thirty years provides evidence
of what conditions best facilitate integrating outcomes in negotiation. 66
For example, we know that mutual information exchange enables parties
to identify value-creating trades, areas in which they can exploit differences
between them to enlarge the size of the overall pie. Indeed, Howard Raiffa,
in a series of famous lectures he delivered at Harvard, posited that maximum
overall value creation occurs under conditions of FOTE: Full, Open, Truthful
Exchange. 67 While one-hundred percent FOTE rarely, if ever, occurs in
negotiation because of concerns regarding the division of the pie,68 it is
nonetheless true that the more comfortable the parties feel divulging
important in negotiation. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 51, at 715-24; Michael Meltsner &
Philip Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS
FOR NEGOTIATORS 205- 11 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004);
James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, in
WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 91-107 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael
Wheeler eds., 2004) (asserting that deceptive and misleading an opponent about one's
true position is a necessary part of all negotiation).
66 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING
134-51 (2002); ROBERT B. CIALDINI. INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 136-70 (3d ed.
1993); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); LEIGH L.
THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 9-31 (2d ed. 2001); Linda
Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); Herbert C. Kelman, The Interactive
Problem-Solving Approach, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 501-19 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen 0. Hampson & Pamela
Aall eds., 1996).
6 7 HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 6 (1996); see also
RAIFFA, supra note 66, at 306 (pointing out that the subjects in a particular simulation
"who did best empirically were the ones who simply announced the truth-the ones who
did not misrepresent") (emphasis in original).
68 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 17.
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information about their true interests and preferences, the more likely it is
that value will be created. 69
We also know that negotiators who have high mutual trust 70 between
them are more likely to share information between them and more able to
brainstorm creatively to facilitate a good outcome. 71
Other factors that increase the likelihood of parties obtaining a value-
maximizing, Pareto-optimal outcome in negotiation include engaging in
informal small talk and communication, 72 increased listening,73 especially
increased use of open-ended questioning by both sides, and the adoption of a
more relational approach.74 We also know that parties who have been trained
in interest-based bargaining are more likely to find value-creating trades than
those who have not,75 and that parties who have been exposed to various
69 Cf id at 207 (discussing how creating a collaborative working relationship with
the lawyer on the other side and promoting effective communication can promote
problem-solving).
70 Matthew A. Cronin & Laurie R. Weingart, The Differential Roles of Respect and
Trust on Negotiation, IACM 18th Annual Conference (2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=726183 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). In this case, I define trust as
the willingness to be vulnerable to another person in the absence of monitoring.
71 See THOMPSON, supra note 66, at 109-36.
72 See, e.g., Kathleen L. McGinn, Leigh Thompson & Max H. Bazerman, Dyadic
Processes of Disclosure and Reciprocity in Bargaining with Communication, 16 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 17, 19 (2003) (citing a host of empirical studies that indicate
that parties who engage in communication produce more efficient outcomes than those
who are not permitted to do so); Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons &
Max H. Bazerman, How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, 38
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 127, 150 (2002); see also Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D.
Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer's Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated
Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 115, 142 (2003) (noting
that "[i]nformal CMC 'chat' (the online version of 'small talk') has been found to
promote good working relationships, just as it does in... [face-to-face] relations").
73 See Neil Rackham & John Carlisle, The Effective Negotiator-Part 1: The
Behavior of Successful Negotiators, Vol. 2, No. 6, J. OF EUR. INDUS. TRAINING 6 (1978);
Neil Rackham & John Carlisle, The Effective Negotiator-Part 2: The Behavior of
Successful Negotiators, Vol. 2, No. 7, J. OF EuR. INDUS. TRAINING 2 (1978) (showing
how more successful negotiators tended to reflect back the concerns of others, test
understanding, and seek information by asking questions more often than those who are
just average negotiators).
74 See David A. Binder, Paul Bergman & Susan C. Price, Lawyers as Counselors, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BusINEss 51-67 (E.
Wendy Trachte-Huber & Stephen K. Huber eds., 1996).
7 5 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 112
(1992) (describing a study where managers who trained in integrative negotiation
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cognitive and psychological biases such as self-serving bias, overconfidence
bias, and the fundamental attribution error are less likely to fall victim to
these biases and therefore more likely to succeed at reaching a mutually
acceptable outcome. 76
VII. Do THE MRPC CREATE CONDITIONS TO ENABLE OR FACILITATE A
GOOD OUTCOME IN NEGOTIATION?
With the knowledge that negotiators are most likely to achieve a
successful outcome under conditions where trust is high, relationships are
strong, information about preferences is shared reciprocally, and parties are
encouraged to brainstorm rather than be constrained by their own partisan
perceptions of possibilities, we can ask whether the MRPC help to create
these conditions in negotiation.
The only rule that addresses legal negotiation specifically is Model Rule
4.1. It states,
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 77
On its face, this rule does not encourage the free flow of information
between the parties. Nor does it necessarily discourage that free flow of
information unless such information exchange would violate the provisions
relating to client confidentiality found in Model Rule 1.6.
However, Comment 2 to Model Rule 4.1 eviscerates much of the
ostensibly neutral thrust of the rule by stating:
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates
of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this
practices outperformed negotiators who had lots of experience but no training in
integrative techniques).
76 See Max H. Bazerman & Katie Shonk, The Decision Perspective to Negotiation,
in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 53.
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2004).
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category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.78
With respect to negotiation, then, Comment 2 undercuts the spirit, if not
the letter, of the rule itself, stripping it of virtually any meaning except to
proscribe bald-faced material lies. As Gary Tobias Lowenthal writes, under
the MRPC the ABA has "unambiguously embraced 'New York hardball' as
the official standard of practice." 79 In short, the Model Rules allow attorneys
to misrepresent their client's bottom line reservation price as well as their
general intentions during negotiation without any risk of violating an ethical
norm.
80
Moreover, Model Rule 1.6, which deals with client confidentiality,
prohibits an attorney from disclosing information relating to representation
without the client's consent unless the lawyer believes that revealing the
information is necessary to prevent certain death or substantial bodily harm,
or to rectify a narrow range of crimes or fraud by the client. 81 Interpreted in
tandem, Model Rules 4.1 and 1.6 create conditions that permit lawyers to
engage in hard bargaining tactics that are misleading and deceptive without
risk of official sanction. 82
Indeed, commentators who have examined the Model Rules with respect
to their appropriateness for problem-solving negotiation agree that, rather
than helping to create the conditions that enable or facilitate a good outcome
in negotiation, the rules tend to do just the opposite: they tend to encourage
dissembling behavior that borders on lying, inviting distrust, bluffing, and
puffery into the negotiation process.83 Because the Model Rules were drafted
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 4.1, cmt. 2 (2004).
79 Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411,445 (1988).
80 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 498, 499 n.85; see also Craver, supra note 51, at 715.
81 See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)-(b) (2004).
82 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 499; Craver, supra note 51, at 715.
83 See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 74 (1994) (arguing that "good reasons weigh against using the
Model Rule's preliminary approach to exclude some conduct from the definition of
deception"); see also James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the
End of "Good Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Steven C. Krane, Ethics
2000: What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323, 327-28 (1999) (as worded, the
Model Rules enable and perhaps encourage lawyers to "practice at the margins of
propriety"); Kovach, supra note 4, at 948 (noting that the "ethical rules that currently
govern lawyers were written with the adversary system in mind. The underpinnings of the
adversary system, with a focus on competition and winning at all costs, provide the
context for the lawyer's work").
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with the profoundly adversarial process of litigation in mind,84 their entire
thrust presumes adversarialism rather than cooperation. Given the goals of
litigation as a process designed to persuade a third party of the truth or falsity
of a certain set of events or allegations, promulgating rules that encourage
sharp adversarialism and that set limits on aggressive behavior may well
make sense.
However, the goals of negotiation are substantially different from those
of litigation. In light of this, it is hardly surprising that the ethical rules
designed to facilitate a good outcome in litigation would be ill-suited to the
negotiation context. Ethical guidelines are not one-size-fits-all. 85 To the
degree that ethical guidelines are designed to facilitate or enable parties to do
their best in a particular activity, they must be geared with the activity in
mind. It is perfectly appropriate behavior for spectators at a baseball game to
carry on private conversations, join in the "wave," eat, drink, and cheer
loudly while the game is in play. Behavior such as this that might be
distracting in another context does not adversely affect the quality of play on
the field. One would not, however, apply the norm of behavior for baseball
spectators to golf spectators on the theory that both baseball and golf are
sports. Because of the concentration required of a professional golf player,
were spectators to carry on independent conversations, do the "wave," or
shout and cheer it would impede the golfer's ability to play the best possible
game. Consequently, the behavioral norms for each sport have evolved to
optimize the quality of play-the quality of the outcome for the sport.
As it now stands, unfortunately, the ethical guidelines that apply to
negotiation are wholly inapt. Though changes in legal education during the
past twenty-five years have put interest-based, problem-solving negotiation
firmly on the map, 86 educators and leaders in the legal profession have done
little to change the ethical guidelines-that is, the behavioral norms and
expectations-that young lawyers will face once they enter the profession.
This would be like spending thousands of dollars on golf lessons for a child,
throwing that child on a course where spectators are howling, cheering, and
drinking beer, and then wondering why the child is not playing golf the way
she was taught to play. If negotiation as a process is to achieve its full
potential-that is, if lawyers are to be able to capitalize on the promise of
84 See Kovach, supra note 34, at 405.
85 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1161 (1995) (arguing that ethics rules
need to be re-crafted to take account of new forms of representation by lawyers).
86 See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 24, at xxxv (discussing how the study
of negotiation, mediation, and other problem-solving processes became institutionalized
in American legal education in the thirty years since the Pound Conference of 1976).
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negotiation as a process independent of litigation-then the bar must make
serious efforts to reform the ethical code under which legal negotiators must
act.
I would like to distinguish my argument here from some of those
criticizing the Model Rules in the context of ADR for their emphasis on the
lawyer's duty of zealous representation.87 In my view, the duty of zealous
advocacy is not the problem. Whether a lawyer is representing a client in
mediation, arbitration, litigation, or negotiation, a goal of zealous advocacy
in the interest of the client is laudable. We need not back away from this in
any re-design of ethics rules for negotiators. The problem is not zealous
advocacy, but rather what zealous advocacy might mean in the context of
each individual dispute resolution process. In litigation, zealous advocacy
means winning an argument by persuading a third party (a jury or judge) that
your version of events or your understanding of the law is true or correct. On
the other hand, in negotiation, zealous advocacy entails identifying the
underlying interests of the client and then employing one's skills of listening,
creativity, and joint problem-solving to best meet those interests and attain a
satisfying and efficient outcome.88 The problem is not the norm of zealous
advocacy but rather that the Model Rules themselves, taken as a whole, treat
zealous advocacy as an aspect of an adversarial battle. Rule 4.1 only
exacerbates this tendency. Whereas this may be effective in the
fundamentally adversarial context of litigation, applying this same template
to negotiation tends to foster clumsy agreements, leave potential value left
unrealized, and produce unnecessary impasse.
87 Kovach, supra note 4, at 949.
The demands of law practices today seem to compel even more extreme
behavior, all of which is employed in the name of zealous representation. Even the
profession itself realizes that constant conduct in a contentious and litigious manner
takes it toll. Lawyers report increased pressure in a ferociously competitive
marketplace and complain about having to work in an adversarial environment 'in
which aggression, selfishness, hostility, suspiciousness, and cynicism are
widespread.
Id; see also Fairman, supra note 4, at 520-22 (outlining the debate between those who
believe that zeal is appropriate for ADR and those who do not); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 4, at 427.
88 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation:
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269, 291-97 (1999).
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VIII. TOWARD A NEW ETHICS OF LEGAL NEGOTIATION
This Article is not the first to posit that the ethical guidelines provided
for in the MRPC and the behavioral expectations of the problem-solving
lawyer are not well-aligned with the behavioral expectations of the problem-
solving lawyer.89 Recognizing that the adversarial bent of the MRPC makes
problem-solving negotiation an even more difficult task for lawyers than for
other professionals not bound by such ethical guidelines, academics have
proposed a number of ways that attorneys might be able to achieve a good
outcome in negotiation despite the unhelpful "noise" created by ethical
norms that result in conditions hostile to value creation and collaborative
negotiating.
Leveraging the fact that lawyers often negotiate with each other
repeatedly and, as a result, tend to gain reputations either as collaborating
problem-solvers or as difficult bargainers, Ronald Gilson and Robert
Mnookin have suggested that individual lawyers might consider creating
more robust reputational markets for problem-solving. By so doing, they
could signal to potential clients that those who have a desire to use
negotiation as a way to create value might consider hiring them for their
collaborative reputation.90
More formal proposals outside the creation and use of reputational
markets typically adopt some kind of contracts-based approach to negotiation
ethics. Chief among the proponents of these have been members of the
growing collaborative law movement, which operates especially in family
law, though is now expanding to other contexts as well. 91 The idea behind
collaborative lawyering is simple. Lawyers involved in collaborative law
associations in a particular state all receive mandatory training in interest-
based, problem-solving negotiation. In addition, they often agree to abide by
a modified set of ethical rules that are specific to the state in which they are
practicing. 92 These ethical rules typically include duties of candor, good
89 See supra notes 40-41.
90 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 525-
27 (1994).
91 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 967 (1999); see also James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative
Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
431 (2002); Sheila M. Gutterman et al., Collaborative Law: A New Model for Dispute
Resolution, COLO. LAWYER, Dec. 2004, at 59; Lande, supra note 41.
92 See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (2001) (Texas was the first state to formally
sanction the use of collaborative law in its statutory code); see, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF
COLLABORATIVE LAW (Collab. Law Inst. of Ga.), available at
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faith, and fair play as well as provisions that shift the norms away from
haggling and dissembling and toward more productive information exchange
and brainstorming. Collaborative lawyers and the parties who hire them
agree that the collaborative attorneys will serve their clients only during
negotiation. 93 Should the clients decide to change processes and move
toward litigation, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from representation and
the clients agree to hire other lawyers for the litigation stage. 94 The idea
behind collaborative lawyering is that the commitment of both lawyers and
clients on all sides to withdraw from representation if the negotiation fails
signals the intention of both sides to participate in the negotiation process in
a spirit of cooperation and good faith. It signals to each side that the other
will be more forthcoming with information about their interests and more
trusting in their interactions with each other. Because lawyers involved in the
collaborative lawyering movement have been trained in interest-based
bargaining, they are also aware of how to create value in negotiation. Hence,
the private ordering involved here separates the negotiation process cleanly
from the litigation process and the modified set of ethical rules involved in
collaborative lawyering helps create the conditions necessary to achieve a
good outcome. 95
In a growing number of cases, Collaborate Law Participation
Agreements (CLPAs) create contracts that require honest disclosure. For
example, Collaborative Lawyers in Arizona agree that the parties will "give
full, honest, and open disclosure of all information, whether requested or
not."'96 Cincinnati's CLPA states that participation in the collaborative law
process is "based upon the assumption that both parties have acted in good
faith and have provided complete and accurate information to the best of
their ability."'97
Collaborative law and other private contracting between lawyers for
ethical rules more suited to negotiation are gaining in popularity, signaling
the growing acknowledgement that negotiation has tremendous promise and
capacity to create value for clients when lawyers can find ways to increase
trust, cooperation, and truthful information exchange.
http://www.collaborativelawga.com/principles.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005);
PRINcIPLEs AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF COLLABORATIvE LAW, available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/collabpg.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
93 Lawrence, supra note 91, at 432.
94 Id.
95 See supra Part VI.
96 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 492 n.59.
97 Id. at 493 n.62.
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However, because collaborative law is essentially a private contract still
subject to the supervening ethical norms and expectations of the legal
profession, problems exist with this approach to negotiation. For example,
there is much debate about whether lawyers can ethically "recuse"
themselves from the prevailing MRPC that govern all lawyer behavior.98
Secondly, enforceability of these contracts remains an open and unanswered
question.99 Questions of enforceability arise at two levels: (1) are these
agreements legally enforceable in court at all?100 and (2) if they are, what is
the reasonable likelihood that an individual attorney will bring suit against
another attorney to enforce these rules given the cost such plaintiff attorney
would need to incur to enforce the contract? Finally, some have expressed
concern about how attorneys' duty of zealous advocacy squares with mutual
commitments of collaborative law attorneys not to pursue litigation if
settlement fails. 1° 1
A third way that some academics have tried to address the problem of
ethics rules not matching up with the realities of practice has been to call for
individualized ethical rules for particular practice areas.10 2 This context-
98 See Spain, supra note 41, at 153.
[T]he practice of collaborative law seems to place an attorney somewhere on
the continuum of a lawyer acting in a neutral, non-representational capacity as a
mediator and a lawyer acting in a representative capacity zealously representing
their client's interests. This may be a particularly difficult role for a collaborative
lawyer to balance.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted); see also Isaacs, supra note 4, at 842 (noting that
collaborative law has not resolved its ethical questions and requires attention and
internal solutions from practitioners).
99 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 479.
100 Id. at 513-14.
101 See Lande, supra note 41, at 1331 (arguing that the mandatory withdrawal
provisions in collaborative law agreements do not violate the duty of zealous advocacy).
102 See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics in Estate Planning and Fiduciary Administration:
The Inadequacy of the Model Rules and the Model Code, 45 RECORD 715, 763 (1990)
(suggesting an ethics code designed for estate planners); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for
Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 149, 150-52 (1993) (recommending the creation of separate ethics codes for
corporate and securities practice); Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 930-31 (1993) (suggesting that the American Law Institute
consider drafting specialized ethical codes); cf David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 515 (1990). As Wilkins explains:
[W]e must abandon the traditional model's commitment to general, universally
applicable ethical rules. General limitations on zealous advocacy purporting to bind
all lawyers in all contexts create only the illusion of controlling lawyer discretion
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based approach to ethics has been heralded for a whole range of specialties
from family law to real estate to bankruptcy to criminal law. 10 3 Practice-area
or context-specific ethics codes have the advantage of allowing increased
tailoring to the intricacies of the law within a certain context. However, this
approach also poses a range of problems. First among them is that
introducing context-specific ethics codes might spawn literally dozens of
ethical codes, creating a mass of confusion for clients, lawyers, and the
profession. Secondly, such a solution would give rise to an entirely new area
of law, one we might call, "conflict of ethics." Figuring out which ethics
rules might apply in a case that involved bankruptcy, a divorce, and real
estate issues would be no easy task. Would the parties in such a case
negotiate to determine which ethical rules they would follow? Would there
be a multi-practice set of ethical rules that tried to split the difference? Or
would there be a hierarchy of ethical rules? The morass such an approach
might create would lead to more problems than the ill-fitting unitary system
we already have.
Recently, Professor Scott Peppet proposed a fourth approach to the
problem of ethics with respect to legal negotiation in the Iowa Law Review.
The quandary his proposal addresses relates to what he calls the
"Collaborator's Sorting Problem." 104 That is, well-trained lawyers who may
want to negotiate in a collaborative and problem-solving way may feel
constrained from doing so because they cannot distinguish, at first glance,
other lawyers like themselves from those who may adopt a more hard-
headed, zero-sum bargaining style. Peppet's piece analyzes the various ways
in which academics and practitioners have sought to address this sorting
problem, including Gilson and Mnookin's proposal to develop reputational
markets and others' various models for collaborative law and contract-based
approaches. He finds all of these to fall short of their aspiration. 10 5
In their stead, Peppet proposes what he calls a contract model of legal
ethics. 10 6 Peppet's model responds to the shortcomings of Gilson/Mnookin's
because they ignore the extent to which that discretion is inevitably reintroduced in
interpretation and application.
Id. (citing Marc S. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 147 (1974)).
103 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the
Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1296 (1996); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The
Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991).
104 See Peppet, supra note 4, 481-484.
105 Id. at 485.
106 Id. at 514.
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reputational approach as well as to the shortcomings of collaborative
lawyering with respect to various ethical questions and enforceability issues.
Under Peppet's proposal, lawyers would be permitted to enter into contracts
for collaboration that would "explicitly trigger public disciplinary sanctions
in the event of breach."' 10 7 However, in order to ensure enforcement of these
standards by the bar, lawyers would be limited in their ability to contract.
They would need to choose one of several sets of pre-determined ethical
rules made available to them by the bar.10 8 According to Peppet, such an
approach would preserve what he calls "moral pluralism" in the profession,
or the idea that lawyers are unlikely to agree upon the appropriate limits of
deception in negotiation or the best way to approach legal negotiation in
terms of misrepresentation, bluffing, and the like. 109 Given the wide range of
views on this issue, it would be futile in Peppet's view, to impose some kind
of normative approach on lawyers. At the same time, however, by limiting
the number of ethical regimes lawyers can choose from to a montage of bar-
approved options, Peppet's contracts approach preserves the advantages that
a centralized, reliable, and predictable ethics code provides as well as the
advantages that a uniform regulatory approach gives toward structuring and
containing a profession."10
Peppet's proposal is bold, nuanced, and well-articulated. Helpfully, he
explains his proposal by revealing the assumptions and reasoning upon
which he bases his contractarian model. His goal is to strike a balance
between those who would prefer a more discretionary approach to legal
ethics, one that stresses the autonomy of clients and lawyers and-what he
considers to be the inevitable "moral pluralism" of the profession-those
who favor a uniform approach to legal ethics on the ground that ethical
guidelines provide structure and guidance to lawyers that they need to make
their ethical decisions easier and more certain. Peppet's proposal addresses
the concerns represented by these various viewpoints and does so, in my
view, exceedingly well, given the assumptions upon which it is based.
IX. THE CASE FOR A PROCESS-ENABLING ETHICAL CODE IN
NEGOTIATION
Peppet's call for a contractarian model endeavors to address the
collaborator's sorting problem. In crafting my proposal for a process-
enabling ethical code for negotiation, I adopt a somewhat different set of
107 Id. at 514.
10 8 Id. at 518.
109 Id. at 510.
'10 Id. at 519.
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assumptions and, in so doing, address a related, but different problem. The
call for an ethical code for lawyers that is tailored to the process of
negotiation and mandatory with respect to negotiation therefore differs
considerably from that offered by Peppet but is at least as sweeping and
foundational in its scope. Indeed, it swallows Peppet's solution by obviating
his problem: under my proposal, all lawyers acting as negotiators would
necessarily be collaborators. Under my proposal, failure to negotiate with a
collaborative approach would constitute a violation of the ethical rules of
legal negotiation.
My proposal is simple: Given that the common understanding of success
or a good outcome in negotiation has evolved during the past thirty years
thanks to the research of those in other academic disciplines, such as social
and cognitive psychology and behavioral economics,"' lawyers must update
the ethical code for negotiation so that it maximizes the likelihood of creating
conditions between the lawyers for them to achieve this good outcome.
In light of this reality, the ABA should promulgate a new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for Lawyers in Negotiation (MRPCN) that would be
mandatory for all practicing lawyers and that would differ enormously from
the MRPC already in use. The current rules would be re-named the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for Litigation (MRPCL). As part of this
reform effort, the ABA's new Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators
would be re-named the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers in
Mediation (MRPCM) and the ABA would promulgate a set of binding Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers in Arbitration (MRPCA).
By promulgating mandatory Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
are specific to the process used by the lawyer in a particular case, the ABA
can best ensure that each set of ethics-that is, each set of behavioral norms
and expectations-is tailored to help lawyers leverage the peculiarities of the
process to achieve the desired or normative outcome of the particular process
being chosen. That is, golfers will be able to play golf with the assurance that
the audience will be quiet and respectful; baseball players will play knowing
that they have the loud and enthusiastic support of their fans in the stands.
Most importantly, spectators will have clarity as to what behaviors are
appropriate in each forum.
A process-specific approach to legal ethics obviates the legitimate
concerns of those who critique collaborative law and wonder whether the
norms necessary for collaborative lawyering somehow violate the current
ethical requirements of the MRPC. 112 A process-specific approach to ethics
also eliminates the concerns of those who wonder about the practicality of
111 See supra notes 66-76.
112 See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 4.
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context-specific legal ethics. 1 3 Instead of spawning literally dozens of
specialized sets of legal rules, this approach simply would create four sets of
rules, tailored to the specific process for which they were written. Lawyers
and clients alike would avoid the "conflict of rules" concerns that a context-
specific approach would generate at the same time that they benefited from a
rule-set that was tailored to the activity in which the lawyers were engaged.
Additionally, a process-enabling approach to ethics rules would truly
help create the kind of environment that would produce the best possible
lawyering, generating and encouraging zealous advocacy that was
appropriate to the process being used by the lawyers at the time.
Finally, the process-enabling approach to legal ethics would be
administrable for lawyers by the bar itself. Unlike a context-specific
approach where several areas of specialization may be in-play at any one
moment, the nature of mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and litigation is
such that all parties can easily know in which process they are engaged and,
therefore, what ethical rules should apply. Also, unlike the contract-based
approach that would be enforceable only through private adjudication by the
parties, a highly unlikely occurrence, a mandatory process-specific set of
rules administered by a state bar association would be enforceable through
public sanction and would therefore provide the necessary deterrent that a
private contract might not because of the high cost of enforcement by any
one attorney against another in a specific matter.
As indicated earlier in this piece, drafters of the MRPCN should craft
ethical rules that create an atmosphere where cooperation and collaboration
between lawyers is increased. To this end, the rules would enforce an
obligation of candor and cooperation on all parties. In order to ensure that
such candor was not exploited, the rules would also need to provide sanctions
for results that were unfair or that failed to at least adequately meet the
interests of both sides."14 The rules would also omit the word "material"
from the current Model Rule 4.1 (a) and instead forbid lawyers from making
any false statement of fact or law to a third person.115
In addition, the rules would require that lawyers have mandatory training
in negotiation theory and skills so that those who are unfamiliar with the
concepts or process of integrative negotiation can have their understandings
113 See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 4, at 513-14 (stating that "[tjhe bar is, and will
likely continue to be, reluctant to promulgate and try to enforce multiple ethics codes
simultaneously").
114 Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39
VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1403 (1986).
115 See Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REv. 577, 589 (1975).
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of negotiation updated and their skills improved. While at first glance this
may seem like an onerous requirement, in fact mediation and arbitration
practitioners are frequently required to participate in some kind of training as
a pre-requisite to engaging in these processes. 1 6 If one agrees that
negotiation is also a specialized process for a specialized purpose, it is not at
all inconsistent to require lawyers to participate in a similar kind of training
in order to maintain a state-of-the-art understanding of this new and
emerging field. In drafting the MRPCN, the drafters might also consider
requiring parties to pro-actively correct others' material misunderstanding 117
and one might also consider rules that would require lawyers to treat each
other with professional courtesy and respect, avoiding difficult or hard-
bargaining tactics. 118
Proposing a MRPCN that enabled negotiators to achieve an outcome that
optimized the parties' interests, was the most value-creating of many options,
was based on fair norms and standards, and that identified commitments that
were specific and operational, all while maintaining clear communication
and building trust, means that the rules would need to provide sanctions for
bluffing and puffing and sanctions for the intentional use of deceptive hard-
bargaining tactics. Enforcement of these sanctions would need to be strict
and names of those who violate the rules would need to be publicized and
published.
X. ADDRESSING PHILOSOPHICAL/INTELLECTUAL OBJECTIONS
An important aspect of my proposal for a MRPCN is that, regardless of
what the specific rules end up being, I would make the rules mandatory for
all lawyers involved in negotiation. The mandatory nature of such a regime is
what differentiates it from both the collaborative law approach and the
contract model proposed by Peppet. Indeed, I imagine the actual substance of
many of the rules in my new regime would mirror the rules found in many
CLPAs. However, by simply forcing all lawyers to abide by the MRPCN that
I envision, I effectively remove the ethical questions raised by those who
116 See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR THE TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF COURT-
REFERRED MEDIATORS (Jud. Council of Va. 1999), available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/tom/tom.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005); REQUIREMENTS
FOR CERTIFICATION OF DIVORCE MEDIATORS (Mass. Council on Fam. Mediation),
available at http://www.mcfin.org/certreq.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
117 See Loder, supra note 83, at 86-88 (noting that nondisclosure in the face of the
opponent's serious misunderstanding is an ethical dilemma that should be examined).
118 Professor Kovach suggests the following elements for a reenvisioned ethical
code for lawyers: ethic of care, honesty, good faith, competency, communication,
empathy, altruism, and trust and respect. Kovach, supra note 34, at 418-29.
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assert that the current MRPC are incompatible with negotiation as practiced
by those who enter into collaborative law agreements. The conflict between
competing behavioral norms would no longer exist, as lawyers would simply
be subject to the new MRPCN when negotiating, not the MRPCL.
The decision to make these rules for negotiation mandatory, however, is
likely to raise serious objections from a host of academics and practitioners
alike. Some will no doubt object to my willingness to impose the problem-
solving or principled idea of a good outcome on all legal negotiators. 119
Under my regime, those who may prefer hard bargaining or beating the other
side would be forbidden from the ethical practice of law. In addition, those
who know little about the ability of skillful negotiators to actually do better
for their client through interest-based negotiation than through positional
haggling will reject the definition of a good outcome I posited earlier and
continue to believe that a good outcome is nothing more than getting more
for a client than the other side is able to claim for its own.
Finally, there may be some who have been exposed to interest-based or
problem-solving negotiation but who, for a variety of reasons, remain
unpersuaded that it produces better outcomes for clients than traditional
approaches to negotiation that focus on distribution over value-creation.
Others may agree that an interest-based or problem-solving approach can be
helpful for transactional lawyers involved in deal-making, but is less useful
in dispute contexts or in situations where the ongoing relationship is
seemingly unimportant. 120 While reasonable people may differ, the
overwhelming consensus of legal academics, supported largely by our
brethren in the hard sciences, now agree that the state-of-the-art prescription
in negotiation tends toward collaboration and a more principled approach as
the best way to do well for your client and the best way to deliver on your
client's interests.1 21 Indeed, value can be created even in dispute situations if
the parties have the skill, know-how, and determination to do so. 122
119 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 514-18 (critiquing the dominant approach and its
reliance upon what he calls the principles of nonaccountability, partisan professionalism,
and regulatory uniformity). Professor Peppet points out, as does this article, that the
oppressive homogeneity of the Model Rules has fallen under attack from many quarters.
See, e.g., supra notes 39-40.
120 See Michael L. Moffitt, Disputes as Opportunities to Create Value, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 174 (noting that those involved in a
serious dispute where trust is gone are not likely to recognize opportunities for creating
value with the other side).
121 The support for integrative, problem-solving bargaining is interdisciplinary in
scope and has an impressive quantitative basis. See supra notes 66-76; see also Catherine
H. Tinsley, Kathleen M. O'Connor & Brandon A. Sullivan, Tough Guys Finish Last: The
Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
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With the vast weight of the empirical evidence in favor of a more
problem-solving or collaborative mindset as the best way to deliver for
clients, I am left ill-at-ease by a regime that would continue to allow lawyers
to choose from a menu of ethics regimes for negotiators, some of which
would sanction hard-bargaining behavior. Let me explain. Imagine that heart
surgeons develop a new way to perform heart surgery, one that could be done
with no incision and a hospital stay far shorter than what is required of
traditional open-heart surgery. There would be a time when doctors would
appropriately want to test the efficacy of this procedure. At some point,
however, it would become common practice to perform surgeries using the
less invasive procedure. Indeed, given the risks of traditional open-heart
surgery, we would expect that the American Medical Association (AMA)
would eventually require its doctors to update themselves on these latest
methods and compel surgeons to use the less invasive technique. The AMA
would want to ensure that all its duly accredited doctors practiced their trade
using up-to-date procedures so as to produce the best possible outcome for
patients. Doctors who insisted in using the outdated and higher-risk
procedure would be prohibited from performing heart surgery and lose their
license for failing to provide the appropriate and prevailing standard of care.
If my argument here is correct, I wonder why the American Bar
Association would not be expected to ensure the same standards of practice
and care for lawyers. If we have come to a point where the vast majority of
those who study negotiation across a range of disciplines would prescribe
collaboration and problem-solving over haggling and contention because it
produces better results for clients, why would the legal profession continue
to allow lawyers to choose an outdated, less effective approach to
negotiation? Preserving a lawyer's personal autonomy or preferences is a
laudable thing as a general matter. However, when the organized bar starts to
preserve the personal autonomy of its members to the detriment of the
profession's clients, I believe that arguments of individual lawyer
"preference" or "autonomy" have been taken too far. To me, allowing
lawyers to choose their ethical regime for negotiation is akin to letting
doctors prescribe a remedy that is known to be medically outdated because
PROCESSES 621, 637 (2002). "Although all negotiations ultimately require value claiming
skills, negotiatiors should be wary of developing a reputation for being a bargainer who
prizes claiming value over all other goals, as this is likely to undercut profits when
integrative issues are on the table." Id. (citation omitted).
122 See Michael L. Moffitt, Disputes as Opportunities to Create Value, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 3, at 173-88; see also MNOOKIN ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 119 (arguing that "[r]esolving legal disputes is not a purely distributive
activity").
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the doctor prefers the remedy or does not know how to prescribe any other
remedy.
In his article defending the smorgasbord approach to legal ethics, Peppet
argues that "the realities of moral pluralism" prevent the bar from imposing a
set of ethical rules that would completely forbid all lying and that would
force legal negotiators to collaborate. 123 For this reason, Peppet believes that
those who have called for a uniform set of aspirational ethics forbidding all
deception go too far. If what drives those who call for such an aspirational set
of ethics is driven by moral superiority, I could not agree with Peppet more.
While my own view is that the bar ought to encourage lawyer behavior that
is ennobling and professionally edifying, I think it ought to respect the
autonomy and individuality of lawyers to make their own decisions as to
what kind of behavior is ennobling, edifying, or morally correct.
However, my argument here does not rest on morality. Instead, it rests
upon an ever-growing consensus of what constitutes a "good outcome" in a
particular process called negotiation. Since the overwhelming body of
evidence suggests that "best practice" in negotiation yields an outcome that
enlarges the overall pie, producing better results for the parties, I am entirely
prepared to hold all members of the profession to the set of ethical standards
that will increase the likelihood that they will achieve these outcomes.
Imposing a new ethical code that forces lawyers to share information, be
forthright, and be collaborative does not impose a "morality" on anyone.
However, it does protect clients from lawyers who would behave using
"older" or "outmoded" technologies of negotiation, those that are now
substandard and not state-of-the-art. 124 Indeed, if there is one thing an
organized and self-regulating professional organization should do, it is
monitor and regulate the behavior of its members to ensure that their practice
remains consistent with the latest technologies and the most up-to-date
methods. In my view, the persistence of the bar in allowing lawyers to
continue to choose hard-bargaining strategies that simply divide a fixed pie
in negotiation not only confounds issues for those who seek to collaborate in
negotiation by making it harder for them to distinguish collaborators from
"sharks," it also puts clients at risk of receiving substandard outcomes from
lawyers who fail to stay updated on state-of-the-art practices.
Another objection to making a new set of ethical rules mandatory for
lawyers is clients and their own preferences. Indeed, Peppet argues that if the
bar imposed a new ethic of bargaining on lawyers that focused on
123 See Peppet, supra note 4, at 510.
124 See Tom Arnold, Advocacy in Mediation, 13 ALI-ABA 535, 542, 558 (1996)
(lamenting how most lawyers have no real understanding of the technologies of
negotiation from preparation to execution).
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collaboration and cooperation, a set of clients who come to lawyers precisely
because they are seeking a tough, gladiatorial negotiator would be forced to
look elsewhere for their agents. 125 My guess is that many clients do, in fact,
come to lawyers precisely because they are angry with the other party in the
dispute. If they are not angry and upset, at the very least many clients retain
attorneys because they would like to claim a larger share of the pie to be
divided for themselves. Consequently, such clients hire the attorney precisely
to serve as the aforementioned gladiator and to use tools such as bluffing,
puffing, and deception.
A centrally important aspect of effective lawyering, however, involves
counseling clients to help them understand more fully their interests and to
work with the clients to help them best meet those interests. 126 It involves
explaining to the client how a problem-solving mindset might be able to
enlarge a pie worth ten "points" and, by focusing on interests and
brainstorming value-creating opportunities, transform that pie into one worth
twenty "points," with distributive advantages for all parties. It is true, of
course, that even the most effective lawyers will, at times, fail to persuade a
client that her interests might be better served by a process that lends itself to
collaboration instead of contention. In cases like this, however, litigation is
likely a better process choice than negotiation.
Even so, there will still be some cases where a client insists on using
negotiation, not litigation, and also insists on using deception, bluffing,
puffing, and other hard-bargainer tactics. Because this is what the client
prefers does not, of course, mean that the lawyer should be permitted to
oblige. Again, a medical example is apropos here. Imagine a patient who
comes to a doctor with serious back pain. The doctor determines that the
patient needs surgery to correct a slipped disc. The patient, however, says she
thinks that what she needs is acupuncture and vitamin supplements because
she insists these remedies will be more effective. Despite the patient's
preferences, doctors have an ethical obligation to not prescribe remedies to
patients that they do not believe are an appropriate antidote to the ailment. 127
This is what distinguishes a profession from those engaged primarily in
purely for-profit business activity. 128 And, despite the increasing business
125 Peppet, supra note 4, at 510.
126 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 179-80.
127 See generally PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (Am. Med. Ass'n), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
128 For a comprehensive overview and listings of ethical codes, see Ill. Inst. of Tech.
Ctr. for the Study of Ethics in the Profs., Code of Ethics Introduction, available at
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/Introduction.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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realities that many lawyers face, lawyers are still professionals, not
businesspeople.129
The fact that the patient may prefer or even demand that the doctor
provide acupuncture and vitamins does not create an obligation on the part of
the doctor to provide these remedies. Does this result mean that the doctor
may lose business to another provider, perhaps one who is not a member of
the medical profession? Of course it does. In light of this sad result, however,
does it mean that the medical profession should allow the doctor to prescribe
a course of action other than what is indicated or appropriate in order to
preserve the money flow? Of course not. Indeed, the medical profession
retains its credibility by insulating its decision-making with respect to
diagnosis from the whims and demands of patients. For lawyers, the same
should be true. If mandatory ethical rules that require lawyers to collaborate
and be candid in information exchange in negotiation result in the emergence
of a new set of negotiating agents who adopt a more contentious approach to
negotiation, so be it. There may even be a small percentage of lawyers who
leave the legal profession in order to continue to ply their trade as hard-
nosed, deceptive, and contentious bargainers. In the long run, the purging of
these sharks from the legal profession will improve the reputation of the
profession and will make it even easier for clients who hire lawyers to get
better outcomes as a result of negotiation.
XI. ADDRESSING PRACTICAL BARRIERS
Apart from these philosophical concerns, there exist more practical
barriers to my proposal of establishing four sets, of ethical rules that are
process-enabling.
A. The Sweeping Scope of the Proposal
Chief among these barriers is the sheer scope of the project and the
enormous inertia that necessarily accompanies a professional association of
the scale of the ABA. Together, they make effectuating a reform of the
magnitude proposed in this article an extremely difficult task, no matter how
attractive the actual proposal may be.
129 See Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 949 (1995) (stating that the law is not and never has been a
"business"); but see, Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why
Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1264 (1995) (making the case in favor of a shift away from
professionalism and toward a business model of lawyering).
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Having said this, throughout its history the bar has endeavored to re-
examine its ethics code to ensure that it was meeting the current needs of the
profession. 130 Most recently, the Ethics 2000 Commission was charged to do
this. Even at the time the Ethics 2000 Commission met, there were some who
suggested that the bar should undertake a re-examination of the basic
structure of the Model Rules since they are based on the fallacy of the
monolithic attorney-client relationship. 13 1 In the end, this did not happen,
however. 132 Indeed, the failure of Ethics 2000 to address adequately the
needs of those in the profession who now engage in process pluralism
encouraged the continued use and development of various private ethical
codes for mediators and arbitrators as well as the further growth of the
collaborative law movement. 133 While there will inevitably be resistance to
sweeping changes in the Model Rules, especially to changes that would
essentially create four entirely different sets of ethical rules, my own view is
that the difficulty of the task should not dissuade those who care about
producing good outcomes and encouraging behavior that will foster such
outcomes from working assiduously for reform in the profession.
To this end, we need to make the case more strongly that each dispute
resolution process really does have a different purpose, a different idea of a
good outcome, and a different set of behavioral norms or ethical guidelines.
Part of this involves law faculty continuing to work with our colleagues in
other disciplines in the academy to produce empirical research to share with
those in the legal profession. Just as importantly, however, those who are
130 See Krane, supra note 83, at 328-29.
131 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 84; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (discussing some
of the differences in the ethical questions faced by lawyers in non-adversarial roles from
the assumptions and ethics of those in a more traditional adversarial stance).
132 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 85 (lamenting that the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission adopted only a de minimis approach to deal with ethics issues in the practice
of dispute resolution despite intense lobbying activity by mediators, arbitrators, and other
third-party neutrals).
133 See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 4, at 842. Isaacs states:
The findamental hitch in the resolution of ethical issues surrounding
Collaborative Law is prevalent throughout the recent expansion of ADR approaches:
without recognized authorities who possess the power to resolve the many ethical
questions emerging from multi-disciplinary approaches, the practice lacks guidance
and credibility. Barring the recent development of any such authority, the next best
solution must come from the proactive efforts of self-governance by Collaborative
Law practitioners.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
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advocates of ADR and who understand it deeply must do a better job of
publicizing stories of value-creating outcomes when lawyers collaborate with
each other.134 The combination of empirical research and powerful stories
together work synergistically to persuade integrative negotiation skeptics that
negotiation is a dispute resolution process that, properly practiced, can
enlarge the pie and capture joint gains.
B. Triggering Ethical Rules
Earlier, I posited that one of the reasons that might explain why there are
not "Model Rules" of engagement for negotiation in the way that there are
for mediation, arbitration, and litigation might relate to the fact that many
may still not view negotiation as a process unto itself but rather as a step
along the way to litigation. In this piece, I have argued that negotiation is
indeed entirely different from litigation-both in terms of its overall
definition of a good outcome but also in terms of the kinds of behaviors that
would be recommended or conducive in one activity over the other. At the
same time, parties involved in litigation will negotiate at times. Sometimes
they will attempt to settle after a complaint has been filed, sometimes after
some discovery has been completed, or often, right on the courthouse steps
right before trial. This kind of bargaining is a component part of litigation
and is not a process entirely separate from litigation.
Under my proposal that lawyers be subject to an entirely different set of
ethical rules depending on the process in which they are engaged, one
challenge would be to know when negotiation ends and litigation begins.
Because mediation and arbitration have been accepted as separate processes
from their inception, lawyers involved in either of these two activities can
easily distinguish in which process they are engaging and what rules should
apply. In order for my scheme to work, lawyers must have clarity as to which
process they are engaged and therefore which rules apply as between
negotiation and litigation as well. This is particularly important given that the
ethical rules I would propose for negotiation vary enormously from those I
would propose for litigation in terms of the required levels of disclosure,
truth-telling, and openness.
Any number of mechanisms might be used to trigger an end to
negotiation and a beginning of litigation. For example:
Lawyers might be presumed to be following negotiation rules in all
interactions until they officially file a complaint.
134 See Bordone et al., supra note 18, at 512 (arguing that popular perceptions of a
field are formed more by compelling stories and vivid images than by empirical
evidence).
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* Lawyers might be presumed to be following negotiation process
rules even after they file a complaint. The rules would shift to
litigation rules once either side filed a formal document with the
court, perhaps called a "Notice of Process Change."
* Another approach would be the establishment of settlement counsel
as separate and distinct from litigation counsel, a proposal already
heralded by others. 135 Under this scheme, a party would hire an
attorney for the negotiation process and, if this did not yield a
settlement, the client would then bring in another attorney for
litigation. The second attorney need not be from an entirely different
firm as the first, but would need to be an entirely different
individual. This scheme has the advantage of creating a clear break
and also opens the way for negotiation as a specialty process in the
same way that mediation and arbitration have come to be thought of
as specialties. A potential downside of this triggering process,
however, is that it may make some clients who know little about
negotiation ex ante simply opt for a litigation counsel at the very
beginning of their engagement or dispute in order to save the
additional cost of ultimately needing to hire a litigation attorney if
negotiation does not work out.
I should note that the problem of determining what process the parties
are engaged in, while important, only matters for lawyers engaged in
disputes. For those whose practice is transactional, the assumption that the
parties are engaged in negotiation is clearer. Moreover, whether any of the
solutions above are acceptable matters less than establishing the fact that,
with creativity and the will, it is possible to craft a relatively simple and low-
cost way of separating the process of negotiation from litigation and from the
back-and-forth kind of bargaining that sometimes accompanies litigation.
C. Enforcement Issues
Enforcement of professional codes of ethics is and always has been a
major challenge. 136 Enforcing the current MRPC, though already quite
135 See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 367 (1999) (describing and making the case for the use of settlement
counsel that is separate from litigation counsel); see also James E. McGuire, Why
Litigators Should Use Settlement Counsel, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 107,
121 (2000) (explaining how the use of settlement counsel can save time and money for
clients).
136 See White, supra note 65, at 91 (suggesting some of the reasons why
enforcement of rules concerning truthfulness is difficult, including the non-public nature
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difficult to do well, is made somewhat easier by the fact that the rules set a
behavioral floor or minimum standard rather than an aspiration. However,
the MRPCN would require an extremely high degree of candidness, honesty,
and information sharing. Because the standard will be so high, monitoring
and enforcement will be both more difficult and, especially in the beginning,
more important in order to create a sufficient deterrent effect.
Despite the challenge, however, enforcement is possible. We see largely
effective enforcement of mandatory "truth telling" in a number of regulatory
regimes from the obligations of prosecutors to make all evidence available
against an accused available to the attorney of the accused 137 to various
required financial submissions public companies must make on a regular
basis to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 138 While there are
clearly those who would endeavor to evade these requirements, the levels of
compliance are extremely high and the ability of enforcement agencies to
detect and discipline those who would evade such requirements is impressive
and effective.
Even in areas where there may have been rampant cheating or "bad
behavior," it is possible to change norms and create an ethic of order. A
prominent and recent example of this includes the downloading of free music
from the Internet using cites such as Napster. Just three years ago,
downloading pirated music for free from such sites was commonplace. 139
Today, thanks to high-profile enforcement efforts, this behavior is rapidly
being curbed as it is replaced with the legal downloading of music from cites
such as iTunes and RealPlayer. 140 Effective, high profile enforcement
of negotiation, the ease of evading detection, and the ubiquity of negotiation as a
process).
137 See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004) (requiring prosecutors to
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused in any way); see, e.g., Casey P.
McFaden, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1224-28 (2001)
(Providing a detailed explanation of judicial enforcement of the prosecutor's duty to
reveal exculpatory evidence to the defense).
138 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (requiring disclosures of off-balance sheet transactions).
139 See, e.g., Online Music Distribution: A New Era, in IPSOS WORLD MONITOR,
Second Quarter 2003, at 24, available at http://www.ipsos-
insight.com/pdf/wm.03.12.02.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (reporting on data frum the
end of 2002 that, "[m]ost Americans participating in online music acquisition are getting
their downloads for free").
140 See Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Intemet & American Life Project Data
Memo, Re: Music and Video Downloading Moves Beyond P2P (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharingMarch05.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2005) (reporting results from a March 2005 survey that found that 43% of music
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combined with a fair, easy-to-understand system for the legal distribution of
music over the Internet transformed a culture in just three years. The upshot
here is simple: a defeatist attitude will ensure defeat. But a concerted effort
on the part of the bar to enforce a new set of ethical rules can work if those
charged with the job of enforcement are committed to the task and given the
resources to make it work.
There is no reason to think that the vast majority of lawyers forced to
follow a new ethical code for negotiation would not comply. Moreover, one
would expect that the ABA would devise an enforcement regime that would
deter many from violating the rules and punish those who failed to be candid,
respectful, and forthright in information exchange.
D. Lawyer's Skill Set
As lawyers have begun to engage in mediation, arbitration, problem-
solving negotiation, and other ADR processes, some have asked the question
of whether their skill sets, orientations, and personality are well-suited to the
demands of these processes, all of which emphasize the value of creativity,
listening, and collaboration over persuasive argument, analytical reasoning,
and traditional advocacy practice. 41 When it comes to personality and
capacity for these processes, there is little empirical data to know how
lawyers measure up against other professionals with these skills. 142
Moreover, it is hard to separate fact from fiction. We do know, however, that
cultural expectations and stereotypes powerfully inform and influence how
individuals behave. 143 We also know that the institutional scripts for lawyers
focus on adversarialism in ways that make a problem-solving or
downloaders had bought music from iTunes or BuyMusic.com, up from just 24% in
2004).
141 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4; Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and
Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 863 (1987).
142 But see Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 547, 581
(1998) (suggesting that research on the psychological profile of law students indicates
that they are more competitive, less able to empathize, and more dominant and unwilling
to compromise).
143 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 167-71 (discussing tacit cultural
assumptions about the lawyering that result in attorneys and clients adopting a zero-sum,
adversarial, or hired-gun mindset).
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collaborative approach to negotiation even more difficult, regardless of what
skills or orientations lawyers may have. 144
Putting aside mere cultural or institutional norms, it may well be true that
those who are drawn to law may be better at rhetoric and argument than at
creativity or listening. The vast majority of lawyers, however, do have the
capacity to participate in various non-adversarial processes with competence
and with a high degree of skill. What they lack is appropriate training. 145 For
many, three years of learning "how to be a lawyer" in law school, followed
in some cases by many years of adversarial litigation practice, simply means
that the skills of listening, collaboration, and creativity are not so much non-
existent as they are under-utilized and, therefore, under-developed. However,
just like a proper weight-training program can build back muscles that had
long been in disuse, the same is true of a proper negotiation skills training
program. Moreover, under a scheme where the MRPCN fundamentally alter
the way many lawyers help parties resolve disputes, one would imagine that
over time those who are drawn to the practice of law will embrace a wider
range of personality types, including both those who enjoy advocacy and
persuasion as well as those who enjoy collaboration and creativity.
XII. CONCLUSION
As the modem ADR movement begins its fourth decade, the idea that
lawyers should be trained to diagnosis the symptoms of a dispute before
prescribing an appropriate dispute resolution process that fits the parties
needs is one that is taking hold in many quarters. There will soon be an entire
generation of lawyers who have some exposure to a broader range of dispute
resolution processes beside litigation. More and more, lawyers are learning to
fit the dispute resolution forum to the fuss. At the same time, lawyers
engaged in these processes have struggled with how to reconcile the ethical
rules of the profession with the exigencies of the new processes.
This paper calls for a radical reform to the ethical regime of the legal
profession. Arguing that ethical rules exist primarily to create behavioral
norms conducive to the successful outcome of a given process, the paper
posits that a different set of ethical rules should exist for each dispute
resolution process. Focusing specifically on the oft-overlooked process of
negotiation, the paper makes the case for a set of rules that would encourage
greater disclosure between the parties, more candid communication,
improved trust, and increased focus on creativity so as to create conditions
that enable parties to achieve a successful outcome in negotiation.
144 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 156.
145 See Arnold, supra note 124, at 557.
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Because the effort to persuade traditional law faculties to include
negotiation as a separate discipline in the law school curriculum has
consumed so much energy, ADR scholars have not paid enough attention to
reconciling the mismatch between what we teach our students is ideal
negotiation behavior and the kind of actual behavior they find in practice.
One way of dealing with this would be to teach behaviors that accept the
reality of a norm of hard, distributional bargaining where those who hold
their cards close to their vest claim more value. Another is to continue to
teach negotiation in a problem-solving mode, as most do now, and encourage
an ever-increasing grassroots movement of lawyers to contract privately
using collaborative law or other market-based approaches. Given what we
have learned empirically about the enormous and largely unrealized power
negotiation offers attorneys to produce better, more valuable outcomes for
their clients by adopting a problem-solving mindset, neither of these options
seems fitting.
Instead, the bar owes it to clients and the public at-large to ensure that its
members are using state-of-the-art techniques and approaches in their
practice. With respect to state-of-the-art best practices for negotiation, it is
clear that encouraging lawyers to share information collaboratively, listen,
and seek integrative outcomes is the best way to capture joint gains.
Therefore, the profession should create and adopt ethical rules for negotiators
that require this behavior.
For those persuaded by the merits of interest-based negotiation as a
powerful lawyering tool, the project of transforming the profession is a
daunting one. Where many would use a market approach, exploiting either
reputational markets or the power of contract, given the scope of the task, a
process-enabling approach to legal ethics dictated by the ABA itself seems
not only the most likely means of accomplishing the goal, but perhaps also
the most responsible given the bar's duty as a professional accrediting
association to protect the interests of the profession's clients. Fitting the
ethical code and behavioral norms of lawyers to the forum being used by
those lawyers will be one of the most important and valuable contributions
that the second generation of ADR scholars, working with legal ethicists, can
make to the successful practice of law.
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